How Could Snowden Attack an Election?
- Douglas Wikström,
- Jordi Barrat,
- Sven Heiberg,
- Robert Krimmer,
- ,
- Helger Lipmaa
- KTH Royal Institute of Technology,
- University of Catalonia/URV,
- Smartmatic Estonia,
- Tallinn University,
- University of Tartu,
- University of Melbourne
Research Output:
Conference Article in Proceeding or Book/Report chapter
Article in proceedings
Peer-reviewOpen access
Publication Information
Output type
Research Output:
Conference Article in Proceeding or Book/Report chapter
Article in proceedings
Peer-reviewHost publication Subtitle
Second International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2017, Bregenz, Austria, October 24-27, 2017, ProceedingsOriginal language
EnglishPages from-to (Number of pages)
Pages 280-291 (11 pages)Publication milestones
- Published - 24/10/2017
Publication status
Published - 24/10/2017
Place of publication
Bregenz/LochauPublisher
Springer, United States, GermanyBook series
- Book series name: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume: 10615
ISSN: 0302-9743
ISBN (Print)
978-3-319-68686-8ISBN (Electronic)
978-3-319-68687-5Publication IDs
- Scopus: 85032467272
Host publication title
Electronic VotingAbstract
We discuss a new type of attack on voting systems that in contrast to attacks described in the literature does not disrupt the expected behavior of the voting system itself. Instead the attack abuses the normal functionality to link the tallying of the election to disclosing sensitive information assumed to be held by the adversary. Thus the attack forces election officials to choose between two undesirable options: Not to publish the election result or to play into the adversary’s hand and to publicize sensitive information We stress that the attack is different from extortion and not restricted to electronic voting systems.
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Accepted author manuscript, 289.66 KB
