COOPERATION AMONG STRANGERS: ALGORITHMIC ENFORCEMENT OF RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE WITH BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SMART CONTRACTS
- Robert Wayne Gregory,
- Roman Beck,
- Ola Henfridsson,
- Niam Yaraghi
- University of Miami
Research Output:
Journal Article or Conference Article in Journal
Journal article
Peer-reviewOpen access
Publication Information
Output type
Research Output:
Journal Article or Conference Article in Journal
Journal article
Peer-reviewOriginal language
EnglishJournal (Volume, Issue Number)
Academy of Management ReviewPublication milestones
- Published - 2024
Publication status
Published - 2024
ISSN
0363-7425Publication IDs
- Scopus: 105039526728
Abstract
Enhancing cooperation among strangers is challenging. Strangers, who lack previous
interactions and trust, cannot rely on human reciprocity as they engage in social and economic exchange. They have instead a tendency to defect for maximizing individual interests rather than to cooperate for benefiting each party in the exchange. Blockchain-based smart contracts come with the promise of solving this dilemma of cooperation. In this paper, we trace this promise to a new mechanism of cooperation, programmed reciprocity, defined as coded instructions for automatically returning good for good (positive reciprocity) and ill for ill (negative reciprocity). Programmed reciprocity is rooted in the algorithmic enforcement capability of blockchain networks, defined as the ability to guarantee the execution of the rules of an exchange agreement without a central authority and the possibility of human interference by either of the involved parties. We propose that algorithmic enforcement capability positively affects the viability of cooperation among strangers on the blockchain through programmed reciprocity. This is contingent on the level of contract complexity and blockchain confidence. Our proposed framework extends the nascent literature on blockchain governance with a novel explanation of how programmed reciprocity can enhance cooperation among strangers. In doing this, it also addresses a significant yet unresolved problem in the literature on cooperation in social and economic exchanges.
interactions and trust, cannot rely on human reciprocity as they engage in social and economic exchange. They have instead a tendency to defect for maximizing individual interests rather than to cooperate for benefiting each party in the exchange. Blockchain-based smart contracts come with the promise of solving this dilemma of cooperation. In this paper, we trace this promise to a new mechanism of cooperation, programmed reciprocity, defined as coded instructions for automatically returning good for good (positive reciprocity) and ill for ill (negative reciprocity). Programmed reciprocity is rooted in the algorithmic enforcement capability of blockchain networks, defined as the ability to guarantee the execution of the rules of an exchange agreement without a central authority and the possibility of human interference by either of the involved parties. We propose that algorithmic enforcement capability positively affects the viability of cooperation among strangers on the blockchain through programmed reciprocity. This is contingent on the level of contract complexity and blockchain confidence. Our proposed framework extends the nascent literature on blockchain governance with a novel explanation of how programmed reciprocity can enhance cooperation among strangers. In doing this, it also addresses a significant yet unresolved problem in the literature on cooperation in social and economic exchanges.
Publication metrics
PlumX, opens in new tab
Citations
19
Captures
43
Access to documents
Submitted manuscript, 375.63 KB
