Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games
- Branislav Bosanski,
- Simina Branzei,
- Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen,
- Peter Bro Miltersen,
- Troels Bjerre Sørensen
- CESKE VYSOKE UCENI TECHNICKE V PRAZE,
- Aalborg University,
- Aarhus University,
Research Output:
Conference Article in Proceeding or Book/Report chapter
Article in proceedings
Peer-review
Open access
Publication Information
Output type
Research Output:
Conference Article in Proceeding or Book/Report chapter
Article in proceedings
Peer-reviewHost publication Subtitle
11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 9-12, 2015, ProceedingsOriginal language
EnglishPages from-to (Number of pages)
Pages 201-215Publication milestones
- Published - 09/12/2015
Publication status
Published - 09/12/2015
Publisher
Springer, United States, GermanyBook series
- Book series name: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
ISSN: 0302-9743
ISBN (Print)
978-3-662-48994-9ISBN (Electronic)
978-3-662-48995-6Publication IDs
- Scopus: 84951875262
Host publication title
LNCS 9470 - Web and Internet EconomicsHost publication editors
- Evangelos Markakis
- Guido Schäfer
Abstract
The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player~1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player~2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's choice. We study Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.
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Access to documents
Accepted author manuscript, 406.57 KB
Accepted author manuscript
Related Event
Title
Web and Internet Economics: 11th International Conference
Event type
ConferenceDate
09/12/2015 - 15/12/2015Location
CWIAmsterdamNetherlands