Anamorphic Voting: Ballot Freedom Against Dishonest Authorities
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- Mohammadamin Rakeei,
- Gabriele Lenzini
- ,
- ,
- ,
- University of Luxembourg
Research Output:
Conference Article in Proceeding or Book/Report chapter
Book chapter
Peer-reviewOpen access
Publication Information
Output type
Research Output:
Conference Article in Proceeding or Book/Report chapter
Book chapter
Peer-reviewOriginal language
EnglishPages from-to (Number of pages)
Pages 266-280 (15 pages)Publication milestones
- Published - 2025
Publication status
Published - 2025
Publication IDs
- Scopus: 105022101572
Host publication title
Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2025 International Workshops - VotingAbstract
Electronic voting schemes typically ensure ballot privacy by assuming that the decryption key is distributed among tallying authorities, preventing any single authority from decrypting a voter’s ballot. However, this assumption may fail in a fully dishonest environment where all tallying authorities collude to break ballot privacy. In this work, we introduce the notion of anamorphic voting, which enables voters to convey their true voting intention to an auditor while casting an (apparently) regular ballot. We present new cryptographic techniques demonstrating that several existing voting schemes can support anamorphic voting.
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