Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games
- Branislav Bosanski,
- Simina Branzei,
- Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen,
- Peter Bro Miltersen,
- Troels Bjerre Sørensen
- CESKE VYSOKE UCENI TECHNICKE V PRAZE,
- Aalborg Universitet,
- Aarhus Universitet,
Publikation:
Konference artikel i Proceeding eller bog/rapport kapitel
Konferencebidrag i proceedings
Forskning
Peer-review
Open Access
Resume
The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player~1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player~2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's choice. We study Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.
Publikation information
Produktionstype
Publikation:
Konference artikel i Proceeding eller bog/rapport kapitel
Konferencebidrag i proceedings
Forskning
Peer-reviewUndertitel på værtspublikation
11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 9-12, 2015, ProceedingsOriginalsprog
EngelskSider fra-til (Antal sider)
Sider 201-215Publikationsmilepæle
- Udgivet - 09/12/2015
Publikationsstatus
Udgivet - 09/12/2015
Forlag
Springer, USA, TysklandBogserie
- Bogserienavn: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
ISSN: 0302-9743
ISBN (Trykt)
978-3-662-48994-9ISBN (Elektronisk)
978-3-662-48995-6Publication IDs
- Scopus: 84951875262
Titel på værtspublikation
LNCS 9470 - Web and Internet EconomicsRedaktører for værtspublikation
- Evangelos Markakis
- Guido Schäfer
Metrikker
PlumX, åbner i en ny fane
Hentninger
14
Antal citationer
1
Adgang til dokumenter
Accepteret manuskript, 406.57 KB
Accepteret manuskript
Relateret event
Titel
Web and Internet Economics: 11th International Conference
Begivenhedstype
KonferenceDato
09/12/2015 - 15/12/2015Lokation
CWIAmsterdamHolland